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Ta ken a mata nos? (Who has killed us?) 
Makamba! (The Dutch!) 
Ta ken a horta nos? (Who has stolen from us?) 
Makamba! 
Ta ken a gaña nos? (Who has lied to us?) 
Makamba! 
Ta ken a bende nos? (Who has sold us?) 
Makamba! 
Awor nan ta yama nos criminal! (And now they call us criminals!) 
– MC Pester, 1993. (Cited in: van San 1998: 256). 
 
 
 
The Top 50 
‘…and so in this way the Caribbean people all retreat and they no longer 
trust anybody. You see? They stay within their own group, you know, and 
they do everything amongst themselves. You see, their own work…doing 
their own things, if anybody comes to them, you know, he has got to have 
good reasons to mix with them and be able to prove it.’1 
Groups of noisy Dutch-Caribbean men are frequently hanging around on 
the streets of Groningen, talking to each other in Papiamentu. Occasion-
ally they flirt with girls passing by and often they are tinkering with their 
cars, while listening to loud music from the car radio. They hardly make 
any contact with people outside their own group. Police, social workers 
and many other professionals attempt to turn them into assimilated citi-
zens, but almost never successfully. Their distrust of native Dutch people, 
and especially of institutions, appears to be strong. Most of these men be-
long to the ‘Top 50’.  
The ‘Top 50’ refers to a list of the most problematic Dutch-Caribbean men 
in Groningen. To be included, a person must be Dutch-Caribbean, a re-
peat offender, jobless, dependent on benefits and in debt. These people 
often lack a permanent place of residence, a proper education and a stable 
relationship as well. Several professionals who work with these people, 
such as social workers and the police, have compiled this list. They called 
these men the ‘Top 50’, although the number of people on the list may 
vary. 
The men in the ‘Top 50’ choose not to participate in mainstream society, 
but they do not explain why. Often their behaviour is labelled as criminal. 
I want to discuss, however, whether this behaviour can also be regarded as 
some kind of civil disobedience.  
I want to use the ‘Top 50’ as a test case for the relevance of the concept of 
‘civil disobedience’ in contemporary pluralistic democracies. I will begin 
by discussing Rawls’ and Arendt’s thoughts on civil disobedience. Using 
the work of Foucault, van Oenen and Žižek, I have uncovered two prob-
lems in Rawls’ and Arendt’s ideas. In the first place, many protest activities 
are not actually addressing government. In the second place, political pro-
tests often present ambiguous and unreasonable arguments to express 
discontent. Finally, I will use the ‘Top 50’ case to argue why the limits of 
civil disobedience need to be reconsidered.    
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Civil Disobedience  
Rawls and Arendt are considered to be the authoritative classic authors on 
civil disobedience. Rawls based ‘A Theory of Justice’ on the idea of a social 
contract (Rawls 1971). In his thought experiment, free and rational sub-
jects are situated behind a veil of ignorance, where they deliberate about 
what the correct rules are in a just society. These subjects are similar to 
the Kantian rational modern subject. They are supposed to be universal 
citizens, lacking specific ethnic or historical roots, who are capable of de-
ciding upon just principles for all. Based on those principles, the majority 
decides which laws and policies have to be put into effect. All citizens are 
participating in the implementation of these principles. A just society has 
to be democratic, according to Rawls, because democracy enables an open 
dialogue between citizens about the way society should be organized. Ac-
cording to Rawls, in a dynamic, pluralist society, government should 
justify its fundamental political choices in such a way that citizens from 
different backgrounds may be reasonably expected to accept them (Rawls 
1999). This can be achieved by founding basic laws upon public reason. In 
‘What is enlightenment’, Kant introduces the distinction between public 
and private reason (Kant 1784), a distinction that is adopted by Rawls. Pri-
vate reason relates to a specific sub-set of the public as a whole, to specific 
religious convictions for example, which are not shared by the whole 
population. Public reason, however, is built on common sense, noncon-
troversial results of science and facts. As a result, Rawls reckons it to be 
acceptable for all reasonable citizens. But even majority rule, justified by 
public reason, may contain injustices, because the interests of minorities 
may be overlooked. In order to rectify this problem in near just societies, 
Rawls introduces civil disobedience in his theory of justice. This may serve 
to correct majority rule in a democracy, because minorities can signal in-
justices by being civilly disobedient and propose solutions to repair those 
injustices. John Rawls defined this concept ‘...as a public, nonviolent, con-
scientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of 
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.’ (Rawls 
1971: 364).  
In the classic examples of civil disobedience, people protest against unjust 
laws and policies by addressing government. A clear example is Thoreau’s 
refusal, in 1840, to pay taxes, in order to protest against an unjust war. 
Gandhi’s protest against the British rule over India is another classic ex-
ample. A more recent one is the civil disobedience of the feminist punk 
rock band ‘Pussy riot’. They gave a very short performance in Moscow’s 
Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, in which they jumped around, punching 
and kicking, with colourful balaclavas over their heads, crying: ‘Mother of 
God, chase Putin away!’ After less than a minute church security men 
stopped them. Afterwards, a Russian court convicted them of hooligan-
ism and they received a prison sentence. In this way, Pussy Riot made a 
political protest that was clearly directed at Putin, the Russian Prime min-
ister, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which represents patriarchy and 
supports Putin. The band’s protest was non-violent and the members ac-
cepted the legal consequences, although some of them fled the country. 
The conviction and imprisonment resulted in massive international at-
tention for their political dissent.  
Arendt values civil disobedience as a safeguard for plurality in society. In 
her essay ‘Civil disobedience’, she distinguishes civil disobedience from 
other examples of disobedience to the law (Arendt 1972). According to 
Arendt, people who enact civil disobedience should be distinguished from 
conscientious objectors, because conscientious objection is an individual 
statement, whereas civil disobedience is practiced by a group. Conscience 
is personal and a moral dilemma is primarily an intrapersonal, apolitical 
conflict. It is about being a good man. However, Arendt states that in civil 
disobedience the dilemma is between being a good citizen by obeying the 
law or disobeying the law because the law is unjust. Civil disobedience is a 
political conflict between objectors and the state. Arendt also distin-
guishes civil disobedience from criminal activities. Criminals avoid the 
public eye, whereas practisers of civil disobedience act out in the open. 
Moreover, criminal behaviour differs from civil disobedience because 
criminals act for their own benefit only.  
‘Civil disobedience arises when a significant number of citizens have be-
come convinced either that the normal channels of change no longer 
function, and grievances will not be heard or acted upon, or that, on the 
contrary, the government is about to change and has embarked upon and 
persists in modes of action whose legality and constitutionality are open 
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to grave doubts.’ (Arendt 1972: 74) 
Rawls and Arendt make a clear distinction between civil disobedience and 
other illegal acts. However, their conditions are rather strict. In order to 
categorise an act as civil disobedience, it must focus on governmental laws 
and policies. Furthermore, the protest has to be non-violent, based on 
conscience and substantiated by public reason. In Kant’s footsteps, Rawls 
considers citizens to possess universal reason, which enables them to 
think for others. Arendt differs from Rawls because she also takes the 
fundamental value of plurality into account.   
Rawls’ and Arendt’s stringent conception of civil disobedience may have 
the effect of turning it into a rather elitist choice. Consequently it may 
cause us to overlook the political impact of protest signals that are not 
clearly articulated, or explicitly presented as resistance against the law or 
policies of government. In the last decade, we have been confronted with 
several manifestations of social discontent that do not fit Rawls’ and Ar-
endt’s criteria. Often these manifestations are labelled as criminal or dis-
ruptive behaviour. As a result, elements of social critique are being over-
looked. Therefore, I want to question the boundaries of the concept of 
civil disobedience, as proposed by Rawls and Arendt. 
 
Localization of the opponent  
I want to question the requirement that civil disobedience is always di-
rected at the laws and policies of a local or national government. In the 
last section, we have seen that, on the one hand, Rawls’ theory is liberally 
oriented in the sense that it gives people equal opportunities in designing 
their lives. On the other hand, van Oenen remarks, there is supposed to be 
ample room for government intervention (van Oenen 2011). Power and 
resistance seem to be connected to the relation between citizens and the 
government they have chosen. Thoreau, Martin Luther King, Gandhi and 
Pussy Riot clearly addressed their civil disobedient acts at the government 
and its policies. Several recent protesters, however, did not. The Occupy 
movement, for example, strives for social change. Local groups have dif-
ferent priorities, but these are all related to changing the economic struc-
ture and power relations. These groups consider large corporations and 
the global financial system to be their opponents. In our neoliberal de-
mocracy, according to the Occupy movement, these institutions favour a 
small financial elite at the expense of the majority of the people, ‘the 99%’. 
From the perspective of the Occupy movement, the economic interests of 
big companies prevail over the political decisions made by democratically 
chosen representatives. Therefore, ‘the opponent’ is no longer a gov-
ernment as such. 
 
Governmental power and disciplinary power 
Foucault offers tools for correcting Rawls’ centralistic model. In Discipline 
and punish, he distinguishes between two models of power: sovereign and 
disciplinary power (Foucault 1975). Sovereign power is used in the rela-
tionship between a sovereign and his subjects, whereas disciplinary power 
structures everyday life. The latter normalises people, so they will fit into 
the format of ‘normality’, the domineering norms in their historical con-
text. In this way, Foucault was decentralising power. Whereas Rawls’ 
theory of justice focuses on a central government, Foucault provides tools 
to recognise power and resistance in other places. Disciplinary power is a 
central element of the welfare state, a model of a state that intervenes in 
social processes. In order to do so, structures are developed in which citi-
zens are the constant object of observation and evaluation. The boundar-
ies between public and private become blurred because of the politicisa-
tion of private life and private relations. Biopower produces the modern 
subject. Whereas resistance against sovereign power is directed at the sov-
ereign, or, in a parliamentary democracy, at government, resistance 
against a normalising power may be much more diffuse. People can resist 
being moulded into normality by stepping out of the system, if possible. 
Because normalising power is everywhere, not only in government but 
also in places like schools, hospitals and prisons, resistance can emerge 
anywhere and take many forms. The idea of normalising power enables us 
to conceive of the refusal to participate as resistance against dominant 
norms. In this way, the anti-psychiatry movement in the eighties, which 
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questioned the need to be ‘normal’ and tried to label madness as a positive 
experience, can be described as resistance. Willis offers a detailed account 
of ‘counter-school culture’, in which working class kids use several tactics 
to avoid learning, such as truancy, doing no work while being in class or 
making practical jokes at the teachers’ expense2 (Willlis 1983). All these 
actions can be explained as a form of resistance against the normalisation 
that takes place in schools. While normalisation strategies are aimed at 
incorporating people in the format of normality (Foucault 2008), deviant 
groups develop various counter-strategies that can be conceived of as 
social criticism.  
 
Democracy and interpassivity 
In addition to the omnipresence of normalising power, the process of de-
mocratisation is also decentralising power. Citizens become more in-
volved with the political process, as they are able to take part in discus-
sions about policies. This is in line with Rawls’ ideas on the ideal society. 
Democratisation, however, can also contribute to a sense of alienation and 
impotence. The classic descriptions of civil disobedience predominantly 
come from Western Europe and North America in the seventies of the last 
century. This was a time in which many different groups struggled for 
emancipation: students were campaigning for participatory democracy in 
universities, for example in Paris in May 1968; feminists were trying to lib-
erate themselves from the shackles of household work and child rearing; 
black people, with leaders like Martin Luther King, were fighting for equal 
rights, for example by going on marches or actions like taking a bus seat 
intended for whites. In addition to these emancipatory struggles, many 
people protested against the War in Vietnam. Rawls and especially Arendt 
were motivated by the post-war urge to fight totalitarianism and this po-
litical activism inspired their description of civil disobedience. As a result 
of the protest movements in the seventies, political participation in the 
Western world has grown. We can conclude that civil disobedience 
worked as a correction to the shortcomings of democracy, as it was in-
tended to do. In the last decades, however, the political landscape has 
changed. According to van Oenen, the political culture of emancipation, 
characterised by a high level of interactivity, has gone too far (van Oenen 
2010). A counter-emancipatory turn into interpassivity, the inability to act 
on norms that the subject himself has chosen, has emerged. Van Oenen 
argues that citizens have become increasingly involved in policy-making, 
in order to attend to their own interests as well as to deliberate about 
social goals (van Oenen 2011). Citizen-participation leads to a strong focus 
on the democratic process, instead of on the ideals and results. People can 
take part in the deliberations, but the results remain unclear (Van Oenen 
2006). According to van Oenen, the political dream in the United States 
used to be ‘a machine that would go of itself’, an organic metaphor of a 
sensitive system, encountering relays, feedback and control. It has 
changed, however, into ‘a machine that goes by itself’, a mechanical 
metaphor for a process that works without external corrections. Many 
citizens have mixed feelings about political participation. On the one 
hand, they do not feel as if they are in control, on the other hand they are 
so heavily involved that there is no way to address their discontent. After 
all, they themselves were the ones who made these political choices. 
Maybe this is the reason why so many recent political protests have been 
much more diffuse than the ones in the seventies, with their ideals being 
hardly recognisable. In this way, perfecting the democratic process may 
lead to alienation. This, in turn, may lead to diffuse expressions of unease 
about the political situation, as a clear opponent is lacking.  
As a result, people may vote for ‘protest parties’, which play a significant 
role in several western countries. These parties, such as the Danish Peo-
ple’s Party in Denmark and the PVV of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, 
set anti-European and xenophobic goals and pretend to offer a way out 
with a return to national values and the national currency. Most voters of 
the PVV, however, say they do not agree with the aims and strategies of 
the party at all. Some even remark it would be an atrocity if the PVV plans 
were to be realised. By voting PVV, they mainly want to send a signal that, 
for example, there are problems linked with the multicultural society, 
and express their distrust of the political elite (Aalberts 2012). Even as the 
Dutch and Danish belong to the wealthiest people in the world and con-
sider themselves to be among the happiest people on earth, according to 
self-report questionnaires (OESO 2011), a lot of them are not striving for 
political ideals. In elections, their choice is determined by dissent and their 
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vote is a protest vote. So even if a political party is quite explicit in its poli-
cies, the parliamentary democratic system can be used for ambiguous pro-
test signals. Where less than a century ago women and black people in 
western democracies were fighting for the right to vote, many citizens 
now give their vote to a party that does not represent their ideals, or re-
frain from voting altogether. This is far from the ideal rational citizens, in 
Rawls’ theory, who deliberate, based on public reason.  
The meaning of these conflicts changes by including in the conception of 
civil disobedience conflicts that are not specifically directed at gov-
ernment, but have a more diffuse character. If, for example, we label the 
refusal by the ‘Top 50’ to participate in mainstream social arrangements as 
a partly political act, we can no longer put them away as criminals who 
isolate themselves from society. In this way we can pull their encounters 
with social workers into the realm of the political. The conflicts have a 
meaning that is relevant for the political context, and appeal to other citi-
zens to re-assess the justness of their arrangements.  
 
Reasonable arguments 
Rawls argues that actors should be serious, sincere and have a moral con-
viction in order to be classified as civil disobedient. Disobedient citizens 
should present public reasons that can be derived from a reasonable po-
litical conception of justice, sufficient to support their unlawful behav-
iour. I want to question whether civil disobedience can only be accepted if 
it is well-argued. Is violence always incompatible with civil disobedience? 
Should riots or movements in which people express their resistance 
against the social-political situation always present substantial arguments 
and unambiguous political goals in order to count as civil disobedience? 
Should the protesters be constructive in changing the political situation? 
On several occasions, activities have been labelled as social protest, even 
when the aim was ambiguous or even quite unclear.  
 
Violence 
Kaulingfreks analyses the political meaning of urban violence by groups of 
young men, who hang around in problematic neighbourhoods in Utrecht 
and Paris (Kaulingfreks 2009). Media and policy papers portray the behav-
iour of these men as incomprehensible, elusive, threatening and opposing 
the political ideal of participation. In this way, these groups are labelled as 
outlaws. Kaulingfreks, however, argues that what might appear as aimless 
violence could also be conceived of as a form of social engagement. The 
refusal to be incorporated can, as such, be interpreted as a critique on a 
society that these men experience as unjust.  
Unlike the Parisian students in May 1968, rioters in the Parisian suburbs in 
2005 were not making demands, carrying banners or formulating explicit 
political messages. They were burning cars instead. Evidently these riots 
were not firmly based on social criticism or substantial arguments, nor did 
they meet the criterion of non-violence. Only the expression of their dis-
content was clear. Žižek describes these actions as ‘Neither offering a solu-
tion nor constituting a movement for providing a solution’ (Žižek 2008). 
Their aim was to create a problem, to signal that they were a problem that 
could no longer be ignored. ‘This is why violence was necessary’ (Žižek 
2008: 66). Žižek labels the behaviour in riots like these as ‘subjective vio-
lence’, which is different from the ‘normal’ situation. This should be con-
textualised, however, against a background of ‘objective violence’, which 
is inherent in the normal state of things. Objective violence is similar to 
what physicists call ‘dark matter’, the context in which we live; we do not 
recognise it as such. Žižek distinguishes two types of objective violence: 
symbolic and systemic violence. Symbolic violence is present in language, 
in the universe of meaning. Language can divide people by assigning dif-
ferent labels to them, which may result in different opportunities. Sys-
temic violence consists of the consequences of economic and political sys-
tems. If we consider violence to be ‘always already present’ and thus 
determining which opportunities individuals get, subjective violence is no 
longer a fundamental break from the normal situation. It can be placed 
on a continuum between verbal and non-verbal acts, which can all be 
more or less violent. Burning cars may thus be a logical reaction to sym-
bolic and systemic repression.  
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Roy makes a similar argument, when she analyses the relationships be-
tween the Indian government and minority groups in the province of 
Kashmir (Roy 2009). According to Roy, the interests of big companies de-
termine Indian politics. In her eyes, the Indian neoliberal democracy is far 
from perfect since it became associated with the free market. ‘What hap-
pens now that democracy and the free market have fused into a single 
predatory organism with a thin, constricted imagination that revolves 
almost entirely around the idea of maximizing profit?’(Roy 2009: 2). Those 
opposing the progress of the free market, mainly poor Indians, are label-
led as criminals, gangsters, Maoists or terrorists. In this way, their activities 
are criminalised and excluded from the political debate. The poor Indians 
can only choose between resistance and surrender. If they do not leave 
their land voluntarily in order to make space for dams or industrial 
plants, the Indian army evacuates them from their territory. Dissenters 
are frequently prosecuted in court. According to Roy, the combination of 
progress – interpreted as economic determinism – and union – inter-
preted as ethnic, religious and national uniformity – forms a dangerous 
mix in India. This results in the marginalisation of minority groups, such 
as Muslims, Adivasis and Dalits. In this manner, the poor lose their chance 
to employ non-violent civil disobedience in order to express their discon-
tent. Referring to Gandhi’s non-violent protests, which are classic exam-
ples of civil disobedience, Roy asks how people who are already starving 
can carry out a hunger strike, how people can boycott foreign products if 
they do not have the money to buy things, and how someone can refuse 
to pay taxes if he does not earn anything. Here again, as in Žižek’s work, 
the origin of violence is assumed to lay in the situation in which the pro-
testers are living, in the policies of government and, closely related to 
that, in the power of big multinational companies. They change the envi-
ronment in such a way that it becomes unfit to live in. Water is polluted, 
land is dispossessed and the course of rivers is changed in such a way as to 
cause droughts, floods and landslides. These conflicts are usually in re-
mote areas, such as Kashmir, where they are kept from the public eye.  
 
 
Diffuse goals 
As we have already seen in the case of the rioters in Paris in 2005, several 
protest groups do not always present clear goals, based on public reason. 
They often express their discontent with society in a diffuse way. The Oc-
cupy movement wants to reconsider the economic structure, but the pre-
cise goals vary from place to place. In London, in the summer of 2011, a 
peaceful protest against the police killing of a 29-year-old Afro-Caribbean 
resident of London escalated into extreme riots, arson and looting. Jour-
nalists and scientists offered many interpretations, just as in the case of 
Paris in 2005. Should we understand this sudden unrest as moral decay, 
expressed as a need for excitement and an opportunity for looting by 
bored youngsters? Or as a social protest? But then, a protest against what? 
Against the increasing social and economic inequality in the UK? Against 
the rising youth unemployment? Against the moral decay of the rich and 
powerful? As a black protest against years of frequent ‘stop and search’ 
actions, particularly of young black men, by the police, combined with 
continuing social deprivation, growing unemployment and a feeling of a 
lack of opportunity? As a general discontent with the police? Unlike in 
Paris 2005, the rioters were not specifically marginal citizens with poor 
prospects. Some of them were successful students from wealthy families. 
One of the prominent activities in the London 2011 riots was looting. The 
criminologists Hall and Winlow offer as an additional explanation for this 
behaviour the suggestion that the rioters were of the ‘post-political’ age, as 
proclaimed by neoliberals (Hall and Winlow 2012). Citizens are no longer 
motivated by political ideals, such as equal rights. They do not identify 
themselves as people who adhere to specific ideals; instead, society is 
dominated by consumer culture as the source for personal identity. Ac-
cording to Hall and Winlow, this explains why the rioters did not express 
their discontent with marginalisation and injustice in political terms, but 
started looting. As Arnon Grunberg wrote, nowadays, the one and only 
ideal is the latest iPhone. We may conclude that protesting against the 
social-political order may take many forms. In many cases, arguments and 
solutions are not reasonable and remain unclear, but the actions obvi-
ously signal the dissatisfaction of the parties involved. These signals have a 
political meaning, which should be taken seriously in the political dis-
course. 
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The Top 50: a controversial case of civil disobedience 
Returning to the Dutch-Caribbean men, also known as the ‘Top 50’, who 
spend their days hanging around on the streets, it seems clear that Ar-
endt’s and Rawls’ conception of civil disobedience does not include their 
behaviour as they do not present any explicit political ideals that aim at 
changes in laws or policies. They refuse to assimilate and this makes them 
clash with neighbours and several professionals in social care and law en-
forcement. I want to argue, however, that their discontent should be 
given voice in the political discourse.  
In the period between 2009 and 2012, several students3 and I interviewed 
people who belonged to the ‘Top 50’ or were personally or professionally 
involved with them. I also studied policy papers on this group, in order to 
get more insight into the practices which were used to normalise the be-
haviour of the ‘Top 50’ and the ways in which they reacted to these at-
tempts (Rothfusz 2012). In policy papers and in the media the ‘Top 50’ is 
usually described as a problem for society. One social worker mentioned 
that it is remarkable nobody ever mentions anything positive about this 
group4. The behaviour of this group is usually not considered to have a 
political aspect and the men themselves do not pretend to be acting po-
litically either. Their motives definitely include non-political ones, such as 
material profit or status seeking. Although some men in this group live 
on welfare and have considerable debts, others earn a lot of money in il-
legal activities such as coke dealing. Their expensive cars and golden neck-
laces are often more tempting for young Dutch-Caribbean men than the 
prospect of a decent job, offered by the social workers. Several activities 
that others experience as annoying are quite normal in Caribbean culture. 
Living on the street, talking loud, showing off valuable possessions such as 
cars and scooters or gold chains, or neglecting strict appointments are 
quite acceptable in Caribbean culture. And for people who do not have a 
lot of money, it is quite normal to avoid expensive garages and repair their 
car on the street instead. By labelling this behaviour as deviant, Caribbean 
culture is placed outside the ‘normal’ social order. In some cases it is even 
criminalised, as assemblies have been banned on the square where the 
men used to meet. Though much effort is invested in involving these 
men in ‘normal’ social life, they retreat into their own social habitat, 
which can be conceived of as a counterstrategy to normalisation strat-
egies. 
The ‘Top 50’ does not express explicit social critique. However, in inter-
views many Dutch-Caribbean men, including those who are integrated 
and successful citizens, mentioned experiences with discrimination and 
unfulfilled promises by public services and employers. This resulted in 
distrust of white Dutch people in general and the administration in par-
ticular. The wife of a former ‘Top 50’ Dutch-Caribbean told about her ex-
periences with rehabilitation:  
‘In general, he always went to the probation officer properly and I always 
accompanied him and, well, in court they said he didn’t show up, so then 
he was really angry. Because he, I knew myself because I always accompa-
nied him because I am a person of ‘appointments should be kept’…Once 
they visited me at home, but his scooter was in front of the door, so I put 
it inside in the evening, but next to my house it was perfectly tidy, quite 
clean, and this probation officer, he wanted to write a report and he said: 
“Oh, you made it perfectly tidy here with the four kids” and this and that 
and he wrote a report and in court they said: “Yes it is a big mess and the 
scooter was in the room, not the perfect environment for kids”.’5 
Another example was the availability of a ‘tinkering workplace’ on an in-
dustrial site. The council provided a place where the ‘Top 50’ could tinker 
with their cars without annoying neighbours. It was a great success. In 
Foucault’s terms, it could be explained as an effective disciplinary strategy. 
The ‘Top 50’ was separated from their neighbours and in the workplace 
they created their own social order, where the men corrected deviant be-
haviour of other participants. However, the council closed the place, be-
cause of a change in financial priorities. What annoyed the participants 
most was not the fact that it was closed down, but the fact that it was 
closed down before the end of the project period upon which they had 
agreed. Due to experiences like this, some of the Dutch-Caribbean men 
lost their faith in the social system. In interviews with the ‘Top 50’ and 
people who are involved with them, it becomes clear that they withdraw 
into their own group and try to become invisible for the administration 
and for professionals who try to assimilate them into a regular life style. In 
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this way, disciplinary control is hampered. This might be interpreted as an 
expression of discontent with their place in Dutch society. Even though 
the ‘Top 50’ does not give a political dimension to their refusal to assimi-
late, there are other Dutch-Caribbean men who do so by pointing to the 
blind spots in the perception of the ‘Top 50’. The rapper MC Pester, who is 
cited at the beginning of this article, expresses their discontent. In this rap, 
which was written in 1993, after police officer Nordholt declared that fifty 
per cent of all street robberies in Amsterdam were committed by people 
from Dutch-Caribbean and Suriname descent, MC Pester is trying to 
change the perspective. Contrary to what the police and the public 
thinks, people like the ’Top 50’ are not the (only) criminals, he says. Like 
Žižek, he signals the objective violence that is already present, both in his-
tory and in present society. In this way, he provides a context for the ‘Top 
50’, which is absent in most analyses of their behaviour. The think-tank 
OCaN, an advisory board of integrated Dutch-Caribbeans, has been asked 
for advice by the government (OCaN 2007). They pointed out that defin-
ing the ‘Top 50’ problem as an exclusive problem of a group of Dutch-
Caribbean men causes a blind spot for the contemporary and historical 
relations between this group and the white majority in the Netherlands. 
Most men in the ‘Top 50’ grew up in a poverty culture in which they had 
few means to influence their own situation. Their presence in the Nether-
lands and their social position are the result of a long history of slavery 
and exploitation in Curacao. Although the Dutch used to be very active in 
the Atlantic slave trade, slavery has never been a major issue in the 
Netherlands (Oostindie 1995). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Dutch authors defended the slave trade with an appeal to its economic 
profitability, but also because the slaves were considered to be lazy, unreli-
able, lascivious and lacking a normal family life. These stereotypes are still 
present in the dominant image policy makers, the media and many non-
Caribbean people use when talking about the ‘Top 50’. Still, the slavery 
past remains a subject that is hardly present in the white Dutch con-
sciousness. On the other hand Oostindie argues that slavery still plays a 
crucial role in the way Afro-Caribbeans think of themselves and of con-
temporary issues, such as racism and social achievement (Oostindie 2008). 
The different valuations of history may contribute to the afore-
mentioned distrust of the Dutch-Caribbean people. Recognition of this 
black page in Dutch history might contribute to the restoration of mutual 
trust. Thus, the refusal by the ‘Top 50’ to participate may open the eyes of 
the white Dutch people to injustices in history and in the present.  
In ‘Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto’, Shelby discusses the critics of 
poor people in black ghettos in the United States, who demand that they 
take greater ‘personal responsibility’ for their choices in life (Shelby 2007). 
They want them to stop blaming the government for their problems. 
Shelby examines whether the situation in black ghettos can be considered 
to be a near just society. He points out how those who grow up there are 
disadvantaged by material deprivation and institutional racism. Shelby 
refers to Rawls, who makes a distinction between two types of injustice: 
on the one hand, the injustice of institutional arrangements in a society in 
which the basic structure is just, and on the other hand injustice in a soci-
ety in which the conception of justice only serves the interests of the cor-
porate and political elite. Shelby argues that in the first situation non-
violent civil disobedience, as practiced in African-American activism by 
people like Martin Luther King, may help to make fellow citizens aware of 
the difference between political ideals and reality. If the political ideology 
mainly supports the elite, however, other means may be necessary and 
justified to convince the majority. In the case of the ‘Top 50’ of Dutch-
Caribbean men, we may doubt if the situation in which some of them 
grew up, in a poor neighbourhood in Willemstad, Curacao, or in a broken 
family in a Dutch suburb, provided them with sufficient opportunities in 
life. Their social context is part of the problem.  
 
Conclusion 
According to Rawls the role of civil disobedience is:  
‘[…] to address the sense of justice of the majority and to serve fair notice 
that in one’s sincere and considered opinion the conditions of free co-
operation are being violated. We are appealing to others to reconsider, to 
put themselves in our position, and to recognize that they cannot expect 
us to acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose upon us.’ (Rawls 
1971: 382-383) 
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In order to reach this goal, Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience should 
be expanded by including ambiguous social critique into the political dis-
course. In his theory, Rawls acknowledges the plurality of societies. In the 
hypothetical original position, the subjects behind the veil of ignorance 
are cut loose from their historical and cultural context (Rawls 1971). In 
his description of political deliberations in a democracy, Rawls is attempt-
ing to overcome the conflicts involved in different comprehensive doc-
trines, by presenting the ideal of public reason (Rawls 1999). This ideal is 
based on the idea of a universal reason that is supposed to be convincing 
for all citizens. Based on the cases described in this article, however, I want 
to argue that plurality is a fundamental aspect of modern societies, which 
cannot be exceeded by a universal reason that is acceptable to all citizens. 
This is in line with Arendt, who pleas for plurality instead of undivided 
sovereignty. Homogeneity is fatal for democracy, according to Arendt, 
whereas conflicts fortify it. According to Arendt, civil disobedience is an 
important factor in strengthening the democratic process by limiting the 
authority and sovereignty of the state (Arendt 1972 and Hannah Arendt 
Center 2011). It raises the awareness of injustice and, as Kaulingfreks ar-
gues, outlaws – people who are placed outside the dominant order – are 
often the ones to offer opportunities for innovation (Kaulingfreks 2009). 
So, civil disobedience is a valuable contribution to society. Part of this 
value is lost if the lines are drawn too rigidly, expelling protest and utter-
ances of discontent that are not clearly addressed to governmental laws 
and policies, as well as unreasonable and sometimes violent actions from 
the political discourse. These actions and this behaviour signal situations 
which, according to the people involved, are serious infringements of the 
principal of equal liberty or of an equality of opportunity, the first and the 
second principle of justice (Rawls 1971). In this way, these actions can help 
us to reassess the moral parameters of our society. Furthermore, the times 
and circumstances have changed since Rawls and Arendt wrote their clas-
sic accounts, and this has resulted in a change of political power strategies. 
I want to argue that this consequently also results in different counter-
strategies, which should be recognised as such. On the other hand, I 
would not like to include all forms of disobedience into the realm of the 
political. Dealing drugs, looting shops and fighting the police are often 
mainly criminal activities, devoid of political meaning. Shelby warns that 
‘The urban poor should not be demonized, stigmatized, or otherwise de-
humanized, just as surely as they should not be romanticized’ (Shelby 
2007: 160). The same applies to the other cases that have been mentioned. 
The line between criminality and civil disobedience should not be drawn 
too strictly, by assigning activities exclusively to the criminal or the politi-
cal realm. Instead of a sharp dividing line, a broader borderland should be 
identified, in which politically recalcitrant behaviour can contain both 
political and non-political elements. By listening to the political messages 
in unruly behaviour we can bridge the gap between different groups and 
enhance the opportunities for the improvement of democracy.  
 
Jacquelien Rothfusz6 is a senior lecturer at the Hanze University of Ap-
plied Sciences in Groningen, in the programmes of Applied Psychology 
and Social Work and is a member of the Labour Participation Research 
Group. She has published books on professional ethics and integration of 
immigrants. She is a PhD candidate at the University of Groningen, in the 
Faculty of Philosophy, Practical Philosophy research group. Her PhD 
supervisor is Prof. dr. R.W. Boomkens and her second supervisor is dr. 
L.Polstra. Email: j.g.rothfusz@rug.nl 
 
References 
Aalberts, C. (2012) Achter de PVV (to be published) as cited in: Dool, P.van 
den (2012) ‘Meeste PVV stemmers zien niets in voorstellen Wilders.’ NRC, 
2012, 9 August [viewed 10 August]   
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/08/09/meeste-pvv-stemmers-zien-niets-in-
voorstellen-wilders/ 
Arendt, H. (1972) Crises of the republic. San Diego, New York, London: 
Harcourt Brace & Company. 
Hannah Arendt Center Bard College (2011) Civil Disobedience & O.W.S. 
[viewed 12 August 2012] http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?p=2705 
Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                       Jacquelien Rothfuzs – Awor nan ta yama nos criminal! 
25 
Kant, I. (1784) ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ In: Berlini-
sche Monatsschrift. Dezember-Heft 1784: 481-494. [viewed 3 October 2012] 
http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/philosophie/texte/kant/aufklaer.htm 
Kaulingfreks, F. (2009) ‘“Rebel without a cause” anno 2009’. In: Tijdschrift 
voor Humanistiek. 10/2009, 37, 44-53.  
OCaN (2007) Adviesrapport OCaN. Change the mindset. Ter bestrijding 
van bijzondere armoede en sociale uitsluiting onder Antillianen en Aru-
banen. [viewed 7 June 2012]   
www.kennisnetwerkantillianen.nl/dsresource?objectid=164832 
Oenen, G.van (2006) A machine that would go of itself. Theory & Event, 
9/2006, 2. [viewed 14 August 2012]   
http://Muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.2vanoenen. html.  
Oenen, G. van (2010) Three cultural turns: how multiculturalism, inter-
activity and interpassivity affect citizenship. In: Citizenship studies, 
14/2010, 3, 293-306. 
Oenen, G. van (2011) Nu even niet! Over de interpassieve samenleving. 
Amsterdam: Van Gennep. 
OESO (2011) OESO, your better life index 2011 [viewed 15 September 2012] 
www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org  
Oostindie, G. (1995) ‘Same old song? Perspectives on slavery and slaves in 
Suriname and Curaçao’. In: Oostindie, G. (ed.) Fifty years later. Antisla-
very, capitalism and modernity in the Dutch orbit. Leiden, KITLV Press, 
143-178. 
Oostindie, G. (ed.) (2008) Dutch colonialism, migration and cultural heri-
tage. Leiden: KITLV Press. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Original edition. Cambridge Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1999) Collected papers. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
Rothfusz, J. G. (2012) ’ Hanging around in suburbia. Understanding nor-
malizing power in professional relationships with Dutch Caribbean mi-
grants’. In: Journal of Social Intervention, 21/2012, 2, 63-82. [viewed 3 Sep-
tember 2012] 
http://www.journalsi.org/index.php/si/article/view/284/266 
Roy, A. (2009) Field notes on democracy. Listening to grasshoppers. Chi-
cago: Haymarket Books. 
San, M.van (1998) Stelen en steken. Delinquent gedrag van Curaçaose 
jongens in Nederland. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.  
Shelby, T. (2007) ‘Justice, Deviance and the Dark Ghetto’. In: Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 35/2007, 2, 126-160. 
Willis, P.E. (1983) Learning to labour. How working class kids get working 
class jobs. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company. 
Winlow, S. and S. Hall (2012) ‘A Predictably Obedient Riot: Postpolitics, 
consumer culture, and the English riots of 2011.’ In: Cultural Politics. 8/ 
2012, 3, 465-488. 
Žižek, S. (2008) Violence. London: Profile Books. 
 
 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License (Attribution-
Noncommercial 3.0). See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/nl/deed.en for 
more information. 
                                                             
1 Interview with Dutch-Caribbean man who supervises Top 50 Dutch-Caribbean’s. 
Translation by the author.  
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2 Surprisingly these tactics and the corresponding values become the ideal preparation 
for a life in the working class, according to Willis (1983). Here resistance turns out to have 
a normalizing effect.  
 
3 These students were studying social work or applied psychology at the Hanze Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences. 
 
4 In interviews, several neighbours, however, were neutral or positive about the presence 
of these men in their streets. Some reported that the liveliness of the neighbourhood was 
greater because of their presence and some remarked how the plurality in the neigh-
bourhood improved tolerance, which made them feel freer to go out in casual wear, for 
example. Others however reported harassment and criminality, such as bicycle thefts.  
5 Interview with Dutch-Caribbean partner of a (former) ‘Top 50’ man. Translation by the 
author.  
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